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IS MANY LIKELIER THAN FEW? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
THE SELF-INDICATION ASSUMPTION 
 
 
Abstract. We analyze the arguments allegedly supporting the so-called Self-Indication 
Assumption (SIA), as an attempt to reject counterintuitive consequences of the Doomsday 
Argument of Carter, Leslie, Gott and others. Several arguments purportedly supporting this  
assumption are demonstrated to be either flawed or, at best, inconclusive. Therefore, no 
compelling reason for accepting SIA exists so far, and it should be regarded as an ad hoc 
hypothesis with several rather strange and implausible physical and epistemological 
consequences. Accordingly, if one wishes to reject the controversial consequences of the 
Doomsday Argument, a route different from SIA has to be found.   
 
1. Introduction: The Doomsday Argument and SIA 
 
Probably the most vigorously discussed application of the anthropic reasoning during the last 
decade has been the Doomsday Argument (henceforth DA). DA was conceived by the 
astrophysicist Brandon Carter in early 1980s (unpublished), and it has been first exposed in 
print by John Leslie (1989) and in a Nature article by Richard Gott (1993). The most 
comprehensive discussion of the issues involved is Leslie’s monograph The End of The World 
(Leslie 1996). The core idea can be expressed through the following urn ball experiment. Let 
two large urns are put in front of you, and you know that one of them contains ten balls and 
the other a million, but you are ignorant as to which is which. The balls in each urn are 
numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 ... etc. Now you take a ball at random from the left urn, and it shows the 
number 7. Clearly, this is a strong indication that that urn contains only ten balls. If originally 
the odds were fifty-fifty (identically-looking urns), an application of Bayes' theorem gives 
you the posterior probability that the left urn is the one with only ten balls as Ppost (n=10) = 
0.99999. But now consider the case where instead of the urns you have two possible models 
of humanity, and instead of balls you have human individuals, ranked according to birth 
order. One model suggests that human race will soon go extinct (or at least that the number of 
individuals will be greatly reduced), and as a consequence, the total number of humans that 
will have ever existed is about 100 billion. The other model indicates that humanity will 
colonize other planets, spread through the Galaxy, and continue its existence for many future 
millennia; consequently, we can take that number of humans in this model is of the order of, 
say, 1018. As a matter of fact, you happen to find that your rank is about sixty billion. 
According to Carter and Leslie, we should reason in the same way as we did with the urn 
 2 
 
 
balls. That you should have a rank of sixty billion or so is much more likely if only 100 
billion persons will ever have lived than if there will be 1018 persons. Therefore, by Bayes' 
theorem, you should update your beliefs about mankind's prospects and realize that an 
impending doomsday is much more probable than you have previously thought.  
This is the original, Carter-Leslie version of DA. The version of Gott (1993) is 
somewhat different, since it does not deal with the number of observers, but with intervals of 
time characterizing any phenomena (including humanity’s existence). Where Gott does 
consider the number of observers,1 his argument is essentially temporal, depending on 
(obviously quite speculative) choice of particular population model for future humanity. It 
seems that a gradual consensus has been reached about inferiority of this version compared to 
Leslie-Carter’s (see especially Caves 2000; Olum 2001), so we shall concentrate on the latter.  
Its underlying idea is formalized by Bostrom (1999, 2000, 2002) as the Self-Sampling 
Assumption (henceforth SSA): 
 
SSA: One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all 
observers in one’s reference class. 
 
In effect, it tells us that there is no substantial qualitative difference between doing statistics 
with urn balls and doing it with intelligent observers (in this sense it is a “Copernican” 
assumption). SSA has several semingly paradoxical consequences, which are readily admitted 
by its supporters; in particular, see Bostrom (2001). Some of them, including alleged 
backward causation, as well as reality of future and/or causally disconnected observers, will 
be discussed in the next section of the present manuscript. Others are strong motivation for 
further work in this area. In particular, the reference class problem (“what counts as an 
observer?”) has been plaguing the entire field of anthropic reasoning. A possible response to it 
is an improved version of SSA, proposed by Bostrom (2000) as “Strong SSA” (SSSA): 
 
SSSA: One should reason as if one’s present observer-moment were a 
random sample from the set of all observer-moments in its reference class. 
 
Although introducing important new elements in the discussion, in particular possibility of 
connection with cognitive sciences, SSSA does not change the essential conclusion of DA.  
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What are main arguments for accepting these sampling assumptions? As emphasized 
by Bostrom (2001, 2002, and references therein), there are both theoretical and practical 
reasons for accepting a statement equivalent or similar to SSA or SSSA. Theoretical reasons 
are manifested in plausibility of reasoning guided by the sampling assumptions in most 
conceivable situations where probabilistic reasoning about a set of intelligent observers is 
required (for a taste of specific examples, see The Dungeon or The Incubator thought 
experiments of Bostrom 2001). In other words, subjective credences assigned by using these 
assumptions maximize one's gain in any appropriate bettings. The practical side is even more 
interesting from our present point of view. In absence of any detailed understanding how 
intelligent observers emerge in the universe, we should not hurry to the conclusion that we are 
in any particular way “special”. This (possibly qualified by further pieces of information) 
typicality is the essence of the sampling assumptions, and it has so far served quite well in 
many areas of application: notably cosmology, but also philosophy of physics, biology, 
quantum physics and even traffic planning!2 This practical side of the issue has the additional 
benefit of emphasizing that these assumptions are not to be taken dogmatically, but will 
probably experience further qualifications and modifications as our knowledge on the 
physical, chemical, biological, etc. preconditions for observership grows (one such 
improvement has, in fact, already been suggested in Chapter 10 of Bostrom 2002).    
However, an entire new strategy has been first suggested by Dieks (1992), and further 
developed by Kopf, Krtous and Page (1994), Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) and, in particular, 
Olum (2001). It is based not on refuting SSA (or SSSA), but on adjoining another general 
anthropic assumption that would compensate for the Bayesian probability shift in DA. 
Roughly speaking, the idea is that an observer is more likely to observe anything (i.e. to find 
herself alive) if there is a large collection of observers compared to the case of a small 
collection of observers. This assumption has, surprisingly, not been precisely defined in the 
papers proposing or defending it, but Bostrom (2000)—who criticized it—proposed a name 
Self-Indication Assumption (henceforth SIA), as well as the definition we may use for a start: 
 
SIA: Given the fact that you exist, you should (other things equal) favor 
hypotheses according to which many observers exist over hypotheses on 
which few observers exist.  
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Other locutions used in the literature (e.g. “one is more likely to find oneself in the long-lived 
race”, Olum 2001) are equivalent to this. The fact that SIA exactly compensates for the DA-
inducing probability shift has been demonstrated by Kopf et al. (1994), and it is certainly 
beyond doubt. However, the other merits and demerits of SIA have remained an open 
question; it has been criticised by Leslie (1996) and Bostrom (1999, 2000). As a recent 
interesting study by Olum (2001) indicates, the criticism has not been decisive, and SIA 
certainly remains—although unwarranted, as will be, hopefully, shown below—a strong 
competitor in the field of anthropic reasoning. 
It should be immediately noticed that SIA is a ceteris paribus statement. Thus, 
rejecting SIA does not mean that we should prefer hypotheses with fewer observers or that we 
should a priori disfavor hypotheses with large number of observers if any other inclination to 
think otherwise exists. This inclination may be the embodied, for instance, by relative 
simplicity of competing theories; it may well be that simpler theory implies more observers 
(we shall return to this point). In other words, one must separate the legitimate a priori bias in 
favor of simpler theories, from the alleged a priori—but conditional upon one’s existence—
bias in favor specifically of hypotheses that imply more observers just because they imply 
more observers. The latter is subject of our critical examination in this study. 
In a recent manuscript, Dennis Dieks (2001) has listed a number of problems 
associated with DA, some of which boil down to SIA, although Dieks himself professes 
strong reservations towards the latter assumption. In particular, Dieks suggests that the 
information about time one lives at necessarily changes the prior probabilities (assigned to 
various hypotheses about the future) in such way that the updated prior probabilities exactly 
cancel with the DA probability shift. Now, this may be literally valid against Gott's version of 
DA, in which the duration of phenomena is crucial. However, in the case of Carter-Leslie 
version, in order to achieve the same result, one has to conditionalize upon the number of 
observers existing in various investigated cases (which is what Dieks actually does)—which 
is just a particular operationalization of SIA.  
All this activity should not convey the impression that the only conceivable reason for 
taking SIA seriously is the answer to DA. This would be an oversimplification. Prima facie, 
SIA stands alone as an assumption in anthropic reasoning whose merits and demerits should 
be investigated. It should be kept in mind that the way of thinking embodied by SIA would be 
attractive for scientists and philosophers even in the absence of the DA challenge. It may have 
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important consequences for currently hotly debated issues in quantum cosmology (Olum 
2001). Therefore, a detailed critical examination is certainly a legitimate endeavor.  
  
 
2. Arguments derived from problems in sampling assumptions 
 
Let us first consider some of the arguments listed against using the alternative assumption 
(either SSA or SSSA) as sufficient in the anthropic reasoning. It is legitimate to invoke such 
arguments in support of SIA as long as we are convinced that alternative assumptions have no 
recourses left. As we shall see, this conclusion is hardly warranted.  
 
2.1. Backward causation implied by SSA 
 
Olum (2001) cites examples of unreasonable predictive powers and alleged backward 
causation implied by SSA and related assumptions as an argument for complementing this 
mode of reasoning by SIA. Detailed and colorful exposition of such cases is given by 
Bostrom (2000, 2001), although the latter author apparently believes that these difficulties are 
surmountable. Let us here cite one of these examples: 
 
It is the year 2100 A.D. and technological advances have enabled the 
formation of an all-powerful and extremely stable world government, UN++. 
Any decision about human action taken by the UN++ will certainly be 
implemented. However, the world government does not have complete 
control over natural phenomena. In particular, there are signs that a series of 
n violent gamma ray bursts is about to take place at uncomfortably close 
quarters in the near future, threatening to damage (but not completely 
destroy) human settlements. For each hypothetical gamma ray burst in this 
series, astronomical observations give a 90% chance of it coming about. 
However, UN++ raises to the occasion and passes the following resolution: It 
will create a list of hypothetical gamma ray bursts, and for each entry on this 
list it decides that if the burst happens, it will build more space colonies so 
as to increase the total number of humans that will ever have lived by a 
factor of m. By arguments analogous to those in the earlier thought 
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experiments, UN++ can then be confident that the gamma ray bursts will not 
happen, provided m is sufficiently great compared to n. 
 
At first glance, the same application of SSA as in DA suggests that γ-ray bursts will not have 
occured, because of their future consequences (vast increase in the number of observers). 
Along the line of thought suggested by Bostrom, we shall try to show that the appeal to 
unreasonable predictive powers and/or backward causation as arguments against DA and SSA 
is based on at least inconclusive premises.  
First of all, long philosophical tradition suggests that there is no reason to reject 
backward causation a priori, in particular if one believes the so-called B-theories of time to be 
correct.3 In fact, as demonstrated in a recent brilliant monograph of Price (1996), backward 
causation may even be necessary for the completely coherent explanation of the conventional 
arrows of time (thermodynamic, radiative, etc.). There is no compelling reason for rejection of 
backward causation as long as one is able to escape the so-called “bilking” paradox, 
representing the root of all causal problems with time inversion or time travel to the past 
familiar from many films and science fiction stories. This sort of paradox arises when one 
claims that it is possible to bring about an earlier event A through a later event B. To see the 
paradoxical consequences of such correlation between future and past, it is enough to 
introduce an additional event C which occurs as a consequence of A and which prevents B 
from occuring. In already conventional terms, the correlation between A and B is bilked by C 
(Flew 1954; Mellor 1981). This problem lies in the background of all stories about an assassin 
travelling to the past and killing one of his ancestors, which prevents him from existing and 
travelling to the past, etc. What is important to notice is that the bilking paradox assumes a 
particular capacity of the bilking agency (e.g. the possibility of time-traveller to go to his own 
past and acts there). This is also transparent in the famous example of Newcomb's game 
“paradox”: seemingly paradoxical results follow only from a very specific and non-standard 
agency of the being which creates the game setup (e.g. Schmidt 1998).   
 It seems quite clear that there is no danger of bilking paradox as far as SSA-related 
issues are concerned. The conclusions drawn from the possible existence of large or small 
number of future observers do not remove a factor necessary for their existence, i.e. there is 
no relevant bilking agency. It is impossible to set up the event C which will correlate with ¬B 
in the DA case. Therefore, although one may classify this as a case of backward causation, 
there is no appropriate paradoxical consequences.4 This mode of defense of what formally 
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represents backward causation is rather well-known in the philosophical literature, and has 
been recently colorfully exposed by Brown (1992) in the context of the time-travel problem, 
relying on several arguments previously put forward by Dummett (1954). Similar argument 
has been used by theologians and philosophers of religion to show that the human freedom of 
will does not cause paradoxes when iuxtaposed with the Divine perfect foreknowledge (cf. 
Craig 1988).  
The second relevant issue is that there is a sort of semantic confusion here. When 
Olum (2001) states that SIA “agrees with our intuition that the chance of an event (e.g., the 
earth being hit by an asteroid) should not depend on the event’s consequences (e.g., humanity 
being wiped out)” he seemingly ignores what he has written only a few pages earlier, that 
“there are different kinds of probability”. There he explicitly distinguishes between objective 
physical probabilities, and the subjective ones following from our ignorance. In the asteroid 
case, we are obviously dealing with the latter, since it is far from clear that we understand all 
factors playing a role in the occurences of catastrophic impacts in earth's history. Besides, any 
appeal to our intuition is unfortunate when temporal vs. causal relationships are concerned; as 
correctly warned by Price (1996, p. 81), “in this area, more than most, our intuitions are a 
poor guide to the explanatory priority”. 
 
2.2. Reality of future and possible observers 
 
Critics of the “sampling” assumptions' (SSA, SSSA) sufficiency and their doomslike 
consequences like to point out that future and/or merely possible observers are not to be 
treated equally (or even not at all) as the past and present observers. This sort of 
argumentation seems removed from the physical point of view. It is well-known that 
fundamental equations of physics (with minuscule exception of CP violations in some rare 
weak decays) know nothing about the direction of time. This was one of the motivations for 
introducing B-theories of time mentioned above, in which there is no temporal becoming, and 
therefore no objective ontological distinction between future and past observers. The 
distinction we tacitly imply in everyday's discourse has to do with our perception of the world 
and with our language, not with the physical structure of the universe (Price 1996). Time 
neither flows, nor do things come into existence except in the trivial sense that we are 
conscious of them at one moment after not having being conscious of them at any earlier 
moment. Thus, the objection to SSA and related assumptions based on different objective 
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status of future observers dissolves on B-theories of time. Now, one may argue that B-theories 
are inadequate for the task, but it is important to understand the price which comes with such 
an attitude. Much of the practical physical work is based on the assumption that world-lines of 
particles within each body constitute a total and unchangeable 4-dimensional shape of 
everything that happens with that body. To reject this notion means to reject a large part of 
modern physics, including the special theory of relativity, as fundamentally incomplete. This 
is the reason why even opponents of the B-theory admit that it may be relevant in respect to 
the physical time (which we are interested in the present context), while asking only that the 
full metaphysical treatment include the temporal becoming.5 The same reasoning applies to 
treatment of possible observers according to SSA, since in any particular situation considered 
there are no possible observers in (our perspectival) past, only in (perspectival) future.  
 
2.3. Causally disconnected influences 
 
There are two sorts of influences allegedly coming from causally disconnected regions: 
probability shifts due to observers which are not currently causally connected with us at 
present (technically speaking, those which are beyond the particle horizon), and those due to 
observers which will remain causally disconnected from us at all times (those located beyond 
the event horizon).6 Our epistemic capacities are different in these two cases, and they should 
not be confused or mixed together as is usually done. For the probabilistic arguments as 
discussed in the introductory section, the former do not present a particular difficulty, exactly 
for the reasons discussed in previous two subsections. The latter may pose a difficulty, since 
the observers beyond the event horizon will stay there forever, and for any practical purposes 
they may as well live in a different, topologically disconnected universe. Their including in 
the total tally of observers in our universe is at least unclear at present (see the discussion in 
Sec. 4 below). This is particularly troublesome if one takes seriously the class of cosmological 
theories which explicitly violates the cosmological principle (homogeneity and isotropy) on 
very large—“superhorizon” in cosmological parlance—scales, as many modern inflationary 
models do. Consequences of this are serious enough: we may in this manner gain additional 
reason to include the values of cosmological parameters of our universe in any realistic 
universal assumption dealing with observership. Namely, the event horizon will arise in our 
universe mainly in the case (considered realistic since 1998) of its possessing a positive 
cosmological constant (Ćirković and Bostrom 2000). Thus, the status of this complaint 
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against sampling assumptions based on causal disconnectedness is inconclusive, to say at 
least. 
 Here the table may in fact be turned and this restriction shown to be unfavorable to 
SIA, since if we accept only observers within the event horizon, this means that we 
automatically favor cosmological theories with smaller number of observers if everything else 
stays the same (horizon by definition encloses smaller spatial volume from the volume of the 
universe). Thus, the true prediction from SIA would be the absence of event horizons in our 
universe, which was widely accepted until a couple of years ago, but is now considered 
disproved on observational grounds.  
 
 
3. Arguments against SIA  
 
People who, like Leslie and Bostrom openly adopt different sets of methodological 
assumptions in the anthropic reasoning, have considered several arguments allegedly refuting 
SIA. Hereby we would like to add several new ones to these discussions. While we consider 
several possible arguments against SIA in this Section, we postpone the so-called 
“presumptuous philosopher” thought experiment until the Sec. 4. The latter thought 
experiment is so rich in its importance and consequences that it deserves a separate 
discussion. For other arguments see Chapters 5 and 6 in Leslie (1996) and Chapter 7 in 
Bostrom (2002).  
 
3.1. SIA and other planetary systems 
 
The presence of terrestrial planets elsewhere in the universe is, of course, of the paramount 
importance for any anthropic discussion. (It is so in particular since Bostrom (2000, Ch. 9) 
has shown that the “freak observers”, i.e. those intelligent beings not evolved similar to 
ourselves, but resulting from accidental environmental fluctuations, cannot significantly 
influence our judgement on the likelihood of cosmological theories.) Leslie (1996) discusses 
Marochnik's (1983) theory about emergence of planetary systems only in the vicinity of the 
galactic corotation distance, and Olum (2001) critically examines the same example. 
However, Olum's discourse is at least confusing on the issue. While admitting that after we 
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find ourselves close to the corotation distance of the Milky Way, we should look more 
favorably on that theory, he writes:  
 
If you feel that in advance of observation, the theory was wildly unlikely, then you 
can feel even though the evidence has made it much more likely, that it is still not 
an especially well-supported theory.  The reason to feel that it is a priori unlikely, 
of course, is that it leads to a very small number of observers, as opposed to the 
theory in which planets are common everywhere. (You could also feel that this 
theory is unlikely, in advance of observation, because of the possibility that it will 
immediately be ruled out by finding that we are in a place where no planets should 
have been.)  
 
First of all, the “explanation” why we should consider Marochnik's theory highly unlikely in 
the first place is just begging the question. Since this is only a reformulation of SIA, it cannot 
give the latter any additional weight. Secondly, the qualification in parentheses is at least a 
strange and highly non-standard criterion for judging a physical theory. By the same token, 
one might have stated in XVI century that Copernican theory of the solar system was 
unlikely, since a simple observation that Earth is at rest (via, say, Foucault’s pendulum which 
could have easily been invented at the time) would decisively disprove it. Such 
counterfactuals are always true, but also not very informative! On the other hand, the criterion 
seems exactly contrary to the classical Popperian view of falsifiability as the main criterion 
for evaluating scientific theories. The theory which is easily falsifiable (as the Marochnik’s 
one) is more scientific than a theory (like the one that there are many inhabited planets in 
galaxies other from ours, used by Olum), which is very, very hard to disprove. Historically 
speaking, the steady state theory did an immense service to cosmology exactly because it was 
much easier to disprove than any of the rival relativistic cosmological models (Kragh 1996).  
There is some independent evidence based on investigation of the recently discovered  
extrasolar planets, that stars with planets (and therefore sites of observers' emergence) are 
indeed anomalous, as far as chemical evolution is concerned (Gonzalez 1999). This, if 
confirmed by subsequent observations, may have several important ramifications for the 
anthropic reasoning. In particular, it may help solve the long-standing problem of not 
perceiving cosmic “miracles”, or any other manifestations of advanced extraterrestrials, 
known as the Fermi's “paradox”. We shall return to this issue later on. For the moment, let us 
notice that on SIA, the hypothesis that stars with planets (and in particular the subset of stars 
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with inhabitable planets) are in any way anomalous is a priori less favored than the 
hypothesis that all or almost all stars have planets. In the situation in which we are at present, 
knowing just minuscule bits about the physical requirements for the emergence of life and 
intelligence, empirical examples on which SIA and similar assumptions may be tested are 
scarce indeed. However, the example of the study of Gonzalez (1999) shows that SIA may be 
misleading, since it would suggest that we should—in the daily research business—
concentrate on the subclass of planetary system formation theories assuming uniform 
formation of planetary systems. In this manner—if the finding of Gonzalez is confirmed by 
further observations—SIA would (mis)lead us to, at least, wasting a deal of theoretical effort 
through ignoring/downplaying an important aspect of the problem. It is not too far-fetched to 
argue, as we shall do below, that it is misleading in other areas too.  
Similar things may happen in cosmology. Consider, for instance, another highly 
controversial cosmological theory, Tipler’s Omega-point theory (Tipler 1986, 1994; Barrow 
and Tipler 1986). In it, the cosmological parameters are strictly constrained by the final 
boundary conditions of the closed universe (this example has the virtue of being spatially 
finite, and therefore completely tractable in view of additional anthropic assumptions). 
However, SIA is inapplicable even in the context of this theory (which should be more 
favorable to SIA than most of other cosmological theories, since it also suggests existence of 
a large numbers of observers overall, here motivated by teleological reasons). The value of 
the cosmological density fraction7 Ω determines the time remaining until the “Big Crunch” 
and, therefore, the maximal spatial size of the universe. We would naively expect Ω to be 
very, very close to unity (while, of course, still larger than unity) in order to have a very big 
universe; but this fails, because final boundary condition precludes it. Also, if one accepts 
rescaling of the time scale more in accordance with the dynamics of physical processes, as 
suggested by Tipler, and investigated earlier by Misner (1969), than it is bizarre to have 
merging of larger and larger aggregates of observers in the infinite subjective time close to the 
final singularity, resulting in effectively fewer and fewer observers (while our new—
rescaled—time axis is infinite).  
 
3.2. SIA and teleology 
 
A general problem with any approach affirming SIA is that it is to some degree necessarily 
reductionist. For instance, one can argue that there is no causal connection between 
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propositions on the predicted number of planets and on existence of intelligent observers in 
any number of competing theories, unless one introduces an additional assumption which 
claims that once you have physical conditions within some prescribed range, the emergence 
of life and ultimately intelligence is inevitable. This is a rather strong assumption, at least 
while we know so little on the actual physical, chemical and biological preconditions for the 
existence of intelligent life. It is important to note that this is not reductionism per se which is 
dubitable here, but its necessity in the framework of such an approach. In general, such form 
of necessity appears mainly in the teleological context, and indeed, the entire set of arguments 
usually claimed for SIA has an air of teleology about it. If there are additional requirements 
for emergence of consciousness (and, contingently, observership) on the quantum level, as 
many modern physicists from Wigner to Wheeler to Penrose thought, than those would 
effectively modify all the relevant priors, and thus invalidate the “simplicity” of SIA. For 
instance, if Wheeler is correct in stating that observers are necessary to bring the universe into 
being (cf. Barrow and Tipler 1986) and we for some reason ascribe positive value to 
existence of larger and larger chunks of the universe, then it may be understood why the large 
number of such observers is desirable. But even then it is not the existence of observers per se 
which is important, but their specific capacity (of reducing the universal wavefunction), 
which invokes the complicated underlying and highly speculative physical mechanism.  
 
 
3.3. SIA and Quantum Mechanics 
 
In the Appendix to his monograph on DA, John Leslie has argued that DA refutes Everett's 
“many world” (or “no-collapse”) interpretation of quantum mechanics (Leslie 1996, pp. 264-
266). We do not wish to comment upon Leslie's argumentation here, just noting that it is 
based upon a particularly strong and literal version of SSSA, counting all possible observer-
moments as admissible. One of the virtues of Bostrom's (2002) approach to the reduction of 
SSSA is exactly that it enables “filtering” of the undistinguishable observer-moments in the 
final tally. Therefore, Bostrom's version turns out indifferent towards the choice of the most 
adequate quantum-mechanical version (which agrees with our intuitions on the subject).  
However, we would like to look at the issue of the “no-collapse” quantum mechanics 
from the point of view of SIA. First of all, such an interpretation is preferable over the rival 
Copenhagen or dynamical reduction or any other interpretation ceteris paribus.8 SIA thus not 
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only supports Everett's theory,9 but will prefer particularly exotic and bizarre branches of the 
universal wavefunction in which the number of observers is much larger due to the 
extravagantly early structure formation, more convenient power spectrum, etc. This is related 
to another old debate in the anthropic reasoning. As noticed by several critics of the anthropic 
principle (e.g. Gould 1985), universe still could be much more hospitable to life and 
intelligence than we perceive it to be. It is reasonable to assume that in Everett's multiverse 
there are many such branches, which would be preferred by SIA. (In other words, the “no-
collapse” theory provides a physical “vehicle” for substantial improvement of the observed 
universe in this—rather simplistically understood—sense of hospitability.) Therefore, the fact 
that we do see physical space which could, in principle (and in agreement with other physical 
constraints, such as energy conservation), be inhabited by large intelligent populations is once 
more the argument against SIA, this time based on the selection of particular branches of the 
universal wavefunction. In addition, since the most fatal illnesses (as well as the old age itself) 
are presumably reducible to the quantum-level phenomena, the reasoning behind so-called 
“quantum suicide” thought experiments (Squires 1986; Price 1996; Tegmark 1998) may apply 
to them, in which cases SIA would suggest not that we should find ourselves near death (vide 
Leslie), but that we should find ourselves—and other fellow humans—immortal as well!  
Of course, a simple solution would be to claim that the “no-collapse” theory fails on 
other counts (for instance the definition of probabilities), so that any application of anthropic 
assumptions, be it SIA or SSA or any other, can not be legitimate. It does not seem an easy 
task, since the “no-collapse” view after more than four decades of its life shows all signs of 
vitality and even increasing popularity (cf. a rough poll in Tegmark 1998), and it seems 
especially appropriate in the quantum cosmological context (Barrow and Tipler 1986). If one 
needs to choose between discarding SIA and discarding the “no-collapse” theory, the former 
option looks significantly more attractive. 
 
 
3.4. Davies-Tipler argument, entropy and SIA  
 
SIA leads to fallacious predictions when it is applied to relatively small spatial or relatively 
large temporal scales. Isn't it obvious that it is more plausible that a typical planetary system 
is inhabited by 109 than 1099 observers? Let us investigate in detail why should we think that 
sometimes small number of observers is preferable to a large number.  
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First of all, observers are here understood as physical entities, subject to physical laws, 
and in particular to the Second Law of thermodynamics. As shown by Szilard, Brillouin and 
others (e.g. Brillouin 1962), there are definite thermodynamical limitations on functioning on 
any information-processing devices, including intelligent observers. In particular, the 
maximal amount of processed information is linearly proportional to the energy invested in 
the processing itself in the ideal case (and in the real case, we expect consumption to be larger 
still). Astrophysically speaking, this means that there is (in principle calculable) an upper 
limit on the spatiotemporal density of processed information depending on availability of 
various astrophysical energy sources, like nuclear fusion in the stellar interiors, or 
gravitational collapse of massive stars or Penrose process of energy extraction from rotating 
black holes. In other words, the entropy production rate in a fixed comoving volume is 
necessarily limited, although as suggested by Dyson in his pioneering study in physical 
eschatology (Dyson 1979), an advanced civilization may wish to intentionally slow it down in 
the extreme to ensure its longevity (and in a special case consider by Dyson even 
immortality). This immediately gives an upper limit to a comoving density of observers in the 
universe.10 True limits are, of course, much more stringent, since the entropy production is 
always larger than the optimal value.  
This does not address only a rather trivial assertion that SIA prima facie supports 
senseless hypotheses like the one of 1099 observers per planetary system. This also answers 
another issue raised in the discussions of  DA and related hypotheses, namely that we should 
limit ourselves to the spatial region which is observable. In that region, the probability 
distribution function of observers p(N) is non-zero only on a finite interval (0, Nmax), where 
Nmax is the theoretical maximal number of observers. Moreover, this function has to behave in 
such a way as to take very small values where N is slightly smaller than Nmax (extraordinary 
optimization required). Insisting on SIA means that p(N) more or less monotonically increases 
with N; this, in turn, implies that the efficiency of energy extraction for purposes of 
information processing increases with the number of observers present in a causally 
connected region of spacetime. This is an anthropic constraint closely related to Fermi's 
"paradox", which was discussed, among others, by Paul Davies and Frank Tipler—in 
particular in connection with the cosmological models with infinite past, but this can be also 
applied (in a weaker form) to finite-past universes like ours. The fact that we have not yet 
found any physical reason for non-existence of supercivilizations billions of years older than 
ours in the Galaxy, and we still do not perceive even the slightest traces of their computational 
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processes and unavoidable entropy increase (not to speak of their physical absence from Earth 
and the Solar system), indicates subtler reasons for preferring ¬SIA to SIA.  
Actually, this is just the second horn of the dilemma. If we wish to avoid problems 
with infinity, we need (as Bostrom 2000 correctly suggests in his footnote 83) to analyze the 
relevant densities. However, too high densities are more implausible than low densities, as we 
have argued above, and SIA is at least of limited application. But the total number of 
observers equals the density of observers times the total volume in a particular cosmological 
model. If we insist on SIA in finite universes, this can only mean that ceteris paribus we 
assign larger and larger probabilities to spatially larger and larger universes, which means that 
(in the context of standard relativistic cosmological models) we favor smaller and smaller Ω, 
while it must be still larger than unity. In accordance with the reasoning above, there has to be 
a reasonably small positive value of ε such that Ω = 1+ε corresponds to the maximum of the 
probability function. This strange method of learning cosmological facts without doing 
observations or simulations leads us directly to our next topic.   
 
 
4. The Return of the Presumptuous Philosopher 
 
Let us again consider the question at the bottom of most of the anthropic thinking: what does 
qualitatively distinguish intelligent observers (or their observer-moments) from urn balls, or 
any other simple probabilistic system? The exact answer to this question depends, of course, 
on the physical, chemical, biological or cognitive preconditions for observership which we 
know very little about. In the meantime, while acknowledging our ignorance, we operate with 
observers as with balls, with some additional assumptions. Some of them are of general a 
priori nature (SIA, SSA, etc.), while others may be physically or sociologically based. As we 
have seen, a part of this additional input is the requirement that the density of observers is 
smaller than some critical value, following from the Davies-Tipler argument. Thus, SIA 
certainly has a limited validity—although it gives higher credence to theories (whatever they 
might be) predicting 10100 observers per planetary system than those predicting only a couple 
of  billion, it is quite obvious which of the two is more likely to be correct. With this in mind, 
we may approach the central SIA-related thought experiment.   
The best litmus test for various related concepts is the beautiful thought experiment 
invented by Bostrom (2000) under the title of “presumptuous philosopher”. The set of ideas 
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embodied in this gedanken and its possible modifications is truly remarkable and 
encompasses almost all aspects of the anthropic reasoning. Let us quote the original version 
before discussing some modifications (Bostrom 2000): 
 
PP1: “It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a 
theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 
(using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is 
very, very big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in the 
cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and there are 
a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations seem 
to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The physicists are planning 
on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the 
presumptuous philosopher: “Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do 
the experiment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times 
more likely to be true than T1 (whereupon the philosopher runs the God’s Coin 
Toss thought experiment and explains Model 2 [which is SIA])!” 
 
Bostrom finds such a posture deeply unfounded, even senseless (hence the qualification of the 
philosopher as “presumptuous”!), thus showing the unacceptable claims directly following 
from SIA. However, there is more here than catches the eye, and therefore we dub the setup in 
this original version for the sake of brevity PP1.  
There are several crucial issues in this type of anthropic reasoning which are 
highlighted by this thought experiment. First of all, there is a condition of finiteness of the 
universe, to which we shall return later. Olum avoids to discuss this problem, since one of the 
more bizarre consequences of SIA is that, by extension, any universe containing an infinite 
number of observers is immediately infinitely more likely than any theory predicting only 
finite number of observers. In other words, finite theories are already discarded, since one 
may argue that there is at least one theory predicting infinite size of the universe and 
satisfactorily explaining all other cosmological data (the ceteris paribus clause being thus 
satisfied). Of course, one may put the definitional proviso, in the manner of Bostrom (2000) 
that infinite case is a priori excluded. However, one can hardly escape the impression that the 
limiting process of bigger and bigger universe will correctly approach the infinite case (at 
least of the smallest infinite cardinality). Therefore, the finiteness assumption requires some 
explanation.  
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But the deepest set of issues stemming from the presumptuous philosopher thought 
experiment is motivated by the following question: what exactly are the theories T1 and T2 
considered here? This is not at all obvious. Bostrom in the original exposition (our version 
PP1) explicates that these are candidates for “The Theory of Everything”, a label theoretical 
physicists often attach to the envisaged unified field theory incorporating all our knowledge 
on the fundamental constituents and forces of the universe (e.g. Weinberg 1993). Such a 
theory would be able in principle to derive any aspect of the observable reality from its 
theoretical structure (including, presumably, a—hopefully small—number of free 
parameters), in the same manner in which Laplace and other classical physicists believed the 
Newtonian theory to be able to predict and retrodict in principle all events in the entire history 
of the universe (cf. Feinberg, Lavine and Albert 1992). Note that after we accept a very weak 
reductionist assumption that there is a finite chance for life and intelligence to spontaneously 
evolve in places with favorable conditions, the only prediction we actually extract from T1 
and T2 is the size of the universe. In other words, we calculate a number of cosmological 
parameters like the total matter density Ω, the cosmological constant (presumably zero or 
negative) Λ, the Hubble parameter H0 and a possible number of other parameters describing 
the difference between the real case and the simple Friedmann model. Now, this is a 
surprisingly small amount of information from entire fabulous wealth the true TOE could 
offer; in other words, T1 and T2 need not be the true TOEs, as long as they are the correct—in 
the sense of being self-consistent and consistent with other relevant physical theories—
cosmological theories, or some wide (but not as wide as the true TOE) theories incorporating 
the realistic cosmological model. The true TOE would contain an enormous amount of 
information beside the simple information on the spatiotemporal size of the universe. In fact, 
one could convincingly argue that the true TOE would be able to predict in principle the 
details of emergence of any one single community of observers and even any one individual 
observer! This is not any more surprising or far-fetched than the classical Laplacian 
determinism.  
Therefore, there seems to be a strange redundancy on PP1. We have two candidates 
for the final theory, both of which could, at least in principle, even if not in practice due to 
computational limitations, predict the exact number of observers in the universe. Since this is 
a thought experiment, one should not worry too much about these practical computational 
limitations; it is enough to suppose that such information is hidden in the equations of both 
candidate TOEs. Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that the comparison between the two 
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theories would be a much simpler task than actually calculating the predicted number of 
observers in each theory. However, in PP1 we choose not to pursue this prediction, but 
instead rely in the assumption of uniformity of physical, chemical and biological processes 
leading to emergence of life and intelligence under similar conditions in various parts of the 
universe, and then compare these highly uncertain, coarse-grained averages. Such procedure 
is arguably much more feasible in computational practice, although it may be noted that for 
the purposes of the thought experiment this does not make big difference. Instead, the 
procedure employed in PP1 introduces not only idea of large-scale uniformity, but also a 
subtle assumption much discussed since Boltzmann, that any consistent universe must be at 
least as large as we perceive through the best contemporary telescopes, and that seems much 
larger than it is necessary for emergence of life and intelligence on Earth.11   
Motivated by these expectations from the true TOE,  let us consider slightly different 
version of the same gedanken experiment, which we shall dub PP2: 
 
PP2: “It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a 
theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 
(using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is 
very big but finite, and contains about trillion trillion observers. According to T2, 
there are a trillion trillion trillion observers in the universe. The super-duper 
symmetry considerations seem to be roughly indifferent between these two 
theories. The physicists are planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will 
falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: “Hey guys, it is 
completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show 
to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1!” 
 
What are the effects of leaving the size of the universe out of the picture? The most important 
gain is that we do not need to worry about the uniformity of processes leading to the 
development of life and intelligence on very large scales. There is a host of contemporary 
cosmological models in which the universe is wildly inhomogeneous at scales larger than our 
particle horizon (especially inflationary models). PP1 is clearly inadequate to cope with the 
situation in such models, since no theory predicting just the size of the universe can tell you 
anything about the number of observers there if you do not accept an additional assumption 
describing uniformity of physical conditions. For instance, let us consider the theory (T2') in 
which the universe is closed, but is 103 times larger (in linear scale) than our particle horizon 
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and galaxies exist only in 10-6 of the total volume, while the rest is filled with black holes. 
How does this theory fare against the alternative (T1') that the universe is 10 times larger than 
our present horizon and completely uniform? If the size of inhabitable reason is the only 
generator of intelligent observers (i.e. there are none of Bostrom's “freak” observers), the two 
theories are completely equal. On the other hand, the presumptuous philosopher in PP1 could 
still argue for T2' with 106:1 odds.  
The problem which remains in PP2, is that it still does not make any difference 
between observers in observable and those in unobservable regions of the universe. Also, the 
problem of necessary finite universe remains with us. Let us, finally, consider the third 
version of the same experiment: 
 
PP3: “It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a 
theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 
(using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the density of 
intelligent observers is about trillion trillion observers per cubic Megaparsec at 
present day. According to T2, there are on the average a trillion trillion trillion 
observers per cubic Megaparsec at present day. The super-duper symmetry 
considerations seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The 
physicists are planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one of 
the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: “Hey guys, it is completely 
unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show to you that 
T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1!” 
 
By this reformulation, we achieve a substantial gain in clarity, since it is now legitimate not to 
worry about causally disconnected regions at all. If we abide by the condition that rival 
theories are true TOEs, it is completely legitimate to compare their predictions on the number 
of observers within our current particle horizon, i.e. predicted observer densities. Now, it is 
obvious that the reasoning of our philosopher must be wrong if the numbers are allowed to 
vary in a very large range. For instance, T2 seems disproved even now, if the number trillion 
trillion trillion (i.e. 1036) applies to our present horizon. One should keep in mind that the total 
number of baryons within horizon is only close to 1080, and that number of galaxies is of the 
order of 1011. It is hard to imagine that there can be 1025 observers per galaxy (and much more 
in the Milky Way, since it is an exceptionally large galaxy in the set of all observable 
galaxies); as far as our Galaxy is concerned, this estimate implies about 1015 or more 
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observers per inhabitable planetary system, which seems wildly implausible, even before 
Fermi's “paradox” is taken into account. 
 Another gain is that we may drop the qualification of universe as finite. Now we may 
as well discuss infinite universes, with infinite total number of observers, while the density is 
everywhere finite. The true TOE is expected to predict both size of the universe and the 
spatiotemporal density of observers. These two predictions should not be regarded as 
redundant, but rather complementary. PP3 is advantageous still more since a critic could 
argue against implausible conclusion of PP1 and PP2 that the conjecture (supported by all 
current observational data!12) that our universe actually is infinite automatically invalidates 
the entire chain of reasoning. PP3 enables us even to compare finite (but very large) and 
infinite cosmological models on even grounds. Hence we easily avoid the problem present in 
PP1 that SIA suggests that an infinite universe is infinitely times more probable than any 
finite universe (i.e. that the universe cannot be closed).   
As argued above, in situations where constant comoving volume is considered, it 
seems more appropriate to argue for smaller number of observers than for the larger one. In 
the manner of Hempel's "raven paradox" (a white sheep observed does lend some credence to 
the hypothesis that all ravens are black!), your existence (and entropy consumption thereof) in 
a finite spatial volume suggest anti-SIA rather than SIA.  
It should be emphasized that it is hardly possible to treat infinite universes without 
introducing the horizon limitation. If humankind is not entirely miraculous, there is a finite 
probability density for a technological civilization to arise at each point of spacetime. By 
virtue of the cosmological principle, all these probability densities, when averaged over a 
large enough volume, must be the same. In an infinite universe, this immediately means that 
the number of technological civilizations is infinite. However, the infinite number of 
civilizations entails multiple copies of every civilization, including multiple copies of 
ourselves as observers (Ellis and Brundrit 1979). Thus, all relevant reference classes are 
infinite, and all auxiliary anthropic assumptions become vacuous: in the same sense as it 
seems fallacious to derive probability shifts from any finite rank in an infinite set of observers 
(SSA), it seems that there is no predictive power in SIA if the set of observers is (regardless 
of the actual theory used) is infinite. How do we compare theories if we know that there is an 
actual infinity of observers in any case?  
 (And even if we do not trust the cosmological principle, it is enough to accept much 
weaker assumption that variations between spatial regions are not too large to prevent 
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intelligence from arising in all but infinitesimal fraction of all spacetime. Since intelligent 
communities/civilizations are discrete entities, the relevant densities cannot asymptotically 
approach zero, and therefore any sum over infinitely many regions must diverge.) 
 
 
 
5. Some Indirect Arguments  
 
In his study, Olum (2001) points out that SIA also suggests some extremely 
implausible epistemological consequences. His example of such pathological behavior is 
worth citing in full, since it indicates one of the weakest points in the defense of this 
assumption: 
 
For example, suppose I have a crazy theory that each planet actually has 
1001010 copies of itself on “other planes”.  Suppose that I (as cranks often do) 
believe this theory in spite of the fact that every reputable scientist thinks it is 
garbage.  I could argue that my theory is very likely to be correct, because the 
chance that every reputable scientist is independently wrong is clearly more than 1 
in 
1001010 . To avoid this conclusion, one must say that the a priori chance that my 
theory was right was less than 1 in 
1001010 .  It seems hard to have such fantastic 
confidence that a theory is wrong, but if we don't allow that we will be prey to the 
argument above. 
 
It should be added here that this degree of confidence is trillions of trillions times higher than 
the degree of confidence we may have about wrongness of ideas postulating ghosts, aether, 
flogiston, extraterrestrial origin of Mayas and Egyptians (or of today's philosophers!), 
geocentrism, etc. Olum's subsequent attempt to show that the paradoxical consequences of 
SIA are encountered in everyday life without anthropic background is flawed (apart from 
obviously being quid pro quo). Since Pascal, we know that it is not the odds per se that is 
interesting in any actual betting, but the payoff also. Olum writes: 
 
However, similar scenarios exist without any dependence on the number of 
observers.  For example, suppose a stranger comes up to you with the claim that if 
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you give him a dollar today he will give you $10 tomorrow.  Presumably you won't 
give him the dollar, which shows (if you are maximizing your expectation) that you 
think the chance he will come through as he says is less than 10%. On the other 
hand, it would be strange to claim that the chance is less than one in a million, 
since sometimes people making statements like this are honest. At this level you 
might even consider the possibility that your whole understanding of the world has 
one chance in a million to be very wrong, and so you can't trust your expectation 
that you won't be paid to this level.  Nevertheless, if the payoff is raised to $10 
million, you still won't give the dollar, which shows that now you think the chance 
for a payback is in fact less than 1 in 10 million. 
 
The last sentence is strange to qualify. The present author would be happy to give a dollar in 
described circumstances, provided that ceteris paribus apply, i.e. that the stranger does not 
give some other circumstantial reason for doubting his intentions (like wearing a mask, or 
being obviously insincere on some other issue). As correctly pointed out by Olum (personal 
communication), this example is loaded with social and economical context and may not be 
the correct analogy. It would be better to consider a complicated hazard game, or a slot 
machine with no epistemic or ethical capacities, only success/failure options. Then the social 
issues (like material inequality of people or all-too-human tendency to cheat) do not play any 
role, and our hypothesis may be stated in the following manner: One should be more ready to 
invest $1 into a game machine (with unknown internal structure) if its specifications promise 
$1,000,000 than in the case they promise only $10. Thus, we escape the implication of Olum 
that there must be some deep underlying probability distribution which is not apparent, but 
may be constrained through analyzing our (intuitive!) chances of win and loss. The main 
lesson is that where truly paradoxical consequences of SIA are concerned one cannot 
legitimately “pass-the-buck” to the general probability/game theory. The conclusion that SIA 
apparently supports all sorts of lunatic theories as long as they imply large number of 
observers still stands. Although it is still to some degree a matter of taste and (probabilistic) 
guts, such price for escaping the controversial consequences of DA seems too high to the 
present author.  
The claim made by Olum (2001) that the eternal inflation and similar chaotic 
multiverse theories successfully obviate DA is also highly suspicious. It is based on at least 
two controversial premises: 
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1. The no-outsider requirement (Bostrom 2000, p. 123), which is by no means 
indisputable, and in the Leslie's (1996) version of DA is absent.  
2. The prejudice according to which observers in different universes must (or even 
may) belong to the relevant reference class.  
Concerning the no-outsider requirement, it seems weakly supported and should be eliminated 
alltogether, but the detailed discussion is beyond the scope of the present manuscript. The 
opinion of the present author is that in the light of modern cosmology, the no-outsider 
requirement undermines any form of anthropic reasoning, since we expect that there will 
always be an actual infinite number of observers in the universe (or multiverse, in the 
cosmological sense); rejection of this requirement is hence desirable, even if it comes with a 
price of a modest form of anthropocentrism (manuscript in preparation). The second 
assumption is controversial from several points of view. If one of the basic motivations for 
believing in the (cosmological) multiverse structure of reality is empirically established fine-
tuning of our universe, this immediately implies that other universes are mainly uninhabitable. 
If we accept the estimate of Penrose (1989), one expects a universe similar to ours once in 
every 
1231010 uninhabitable universes. Now the presumptive character of SIA is manifested on 
even more grandiose scale than in the case of our old friend, the presumptuous philosopher. It 
would be bad form of anthropocentrism to conclude that standards of observership valid here 
are necessarily valid in the other universes with different physical laws and different sets of 
fundamental constants—especially if this far-fetched conclusion is motivated by desire to 
avoid what is perceived as the controversial conclusion of DA. Quite to the contrary, there 
may be some reason following from the foundations of the decoherence theory to expect that 
different universes will determine different forms of consciousness, and therefore entail 
radically different standards of observership (Dugić et al. 2000). Such approach, exactly 
contrary to the one intended to refute DA in the multiverse case, will have an additional 
advantage in automatically solving the reference class problems, at least for this case.  
In addition, one may recognize a double standard in trying to solve the DA “problem” 
in the multiverse, since if Bostrom (2000) is incorrect in applying SSA to causally 
disconnected regions of our universe, the same verdict applies a fortiori to any 
pronouncement taking into account inhabitants of other universes. In particular it is so as 
long as no satisfactory theoretical argument or observational finding for a topological 
connection between various universes is offered. The least one can say as a conclusion to this 
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issue is that postulating the existence (and particular properties) of the multiverse can not 
really help us solve the DA problem.  
 
 
6. Conclusions: Too Early for Optimism? 
 
Our conclusion is that it is too early to accept SIA as an antidote to controversial and 
(seemingly) apocalyptic conclusions of the Doomsday argument. We know too little on the 
necessary physical requirements for observership to establish what additional assumptions are 
more justified in application of statistics to intelligent observership on that (physical, 
chemical, etc.) grounds. While pursuing that goal, we should also seriously consider 
epistemological and methodological grounds for accepting or rejecting any of these general 
assumptions proposed in the literature (SSA, SIA, SSSA, etc.). In particular, the Self-
Indication Assumption is unable to satisfactorily substitute for our ignorance in the relevant 
field. It has several empirically wrong and epistemologically contrived consequences, while 
there is no compelling evidence for accepting it—apart from the DA cancellation. On the 
other hand, it runs afoul of “no-collapse” quantum mechanical theories, as well as several 
cosmological and astrobiological arguments (notably Davies-Tipler argument). The 
Presumptuous Philosopher thought experiment remains a serious problem for it, and may be 
cast in even more detrimental form, from the SIA proponents’ point of view. Finally, issues in 
confirmation theory become hopelessly muddled whenever—SIA accepted—theories 
involving large number of observers are invoked. Taken together, this argumentation indicates 
the insufficiency of Self-Indication Assumption and the necessity of taking some different 
path if the refutation of Doomsday Argument is desired.  
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1 For instance, p. 316 of Gott (1993).  
2 These examples are elaborated in Bostrom (2002). The present author would add importance of these 
assumptions for the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) problems and—rather obviously—
demographics. 
3 That B-theories of time (“tenseless”, “atemporal”) are more in accordance with the findings of physical 
sciences has been commented by Grünbaum (1991), Oaklender (1984) and Price (1996). Also, the general 
plausibility of backward causation has been recently defended, among others, by Brown (1992). 
4 On the contrary, one may argue that if there is a causal problem, it may obviate the reasoning linking the 
sampling assumption to “paradoxical” consequences, and not the assumption itself. For instance, we might claim 
that the very validity of SSA implies “doomsday” of a sort which will prevent the creation of a governing body 
such as the described UN++ (a manuscript of the present author, in preparation).  
5  Thus, for instance, Prof. William L. Craig writes: “It is entirely possible that the time of physics is, in fact, a B-
theoretic time, but that this is an abstraction, a skeleton, of full-blooded metaphysical time, which is an A-
theoretic time.” (Craig 1992) 
6 A nice semi-popular exposition of the cosmological horizon lore can be found in Ellis and Rothman (1993).  
7 As is well known, Ω is the ratio of physical density of all matter fields to the so-called critical density 
necessary for universe to stop current expansion and recollapse toward Big Crunch. Thus, Ω ≤ 1 universes will 
expand forever, while Ω > 1 universes will recollapse. This strictly applies only to the case of matter fields 
possessing “regular” equation of state; in the presence of vacuum energy, indicated by recent cosmological 
supernovae experiments, the situation becomes more complicated. However, the basic conclusion that if Ω in the 
matter fields (Ωm) is less than (or equal to) unity and the sign of additional vacuum energy is positive (which is 
the standard view) the universe is infinite and ever-expanding. 
8 The proponent of SIA could argue against such conclusion by stating that—especially in view of the theory-
like nature of the “no-collapse” view (see below and the next endnote)—the condition of ceteris paribus is never 
satisfied. However, this argumentation brings us in an awkward epistemic position since then one may also argue 
that yet unobserved minuscule effects (like those of inter-branch interaction which may manifest themselves in 
the Everett’s theory and not in the standard quantum mechanics) will always obstruct using SIA or any other 
probabilistic assumption in evaluation of scientific theories. This recourse amounts to a sort of global 
explanatory nihilism to be accepted only in the complete lack of alternatives.   
9 And there is a slowly building consensus that it is a separate theory, not just an interpretation of the quantum 
mechanical formalism; for some of the arguments, see Squires (1986), Price (1996) and Page (1999). Some of 
the (still thought) experiments discriminating between Everett’s theory and the orthodox quantum mechanics are 
described by Deutsch (1985), Plaga (1997) and Tegmark (1998). This also comes some further steps toward 
addressing Olum’s correct point that “physical processes (such as those that might lead to destruction) should not 
depend on a choice of quantum mechanics interpretations”; however, it is hardly possible to claim that predicted 
physical processes should not depend on a choice of the correct quantum mechanical theory!  
10 There is an additional tacit assumption here, and that is that the topology of our universe is either trivial, or at 
least not contrived in such way that arbitrarily high negentropy sources in other regions (“other universes”) may 
be brought into contact with the heat bath in a fixed comoving volume. This assumption is a rather weak one, 
and even if it is not entirely satisfied, one may argue that there are extraneous requirements that limit the growth 
of civilizations in such a universe (Ćirković and Bostrom 2000).   
11 This is the famous argument of Feynman (1965) against the anthropic explanation of the thermodynamical 
temporal asymmetry. As Barrow and Tipler (1986) correctly point out, it is not entirely valid in the context of 
modern cosmology, and there is some minimal size which any universe containing intelligent observers must 
have, due to power spectrum of density perturbations, galaxy formation, and other astrophysical “details”. 
However, these latter considerations should not worry SIA-proponents: they will find Feynman's remark a priori 
wrong, since it predicts only a very small number of observers in the universe both at present and at all times 
(while there is at least one competing empirically acceptable theory implying a larger number of observers). If 
only solving cosmological puzzles were that easy! 
12 Contrary to the situation encountered in most philosophical discourses, even recent ones (e.g. Price 1996), 
practically entire observational cosmology offers arguments supporting the infinite size of the universe (e.g. 
Peebles 1993). The conclusion that our universe is open (i.e. that the density of the matter in the universe is 
significantly smaller than the critical value for recollapse, or at best equal to it) is strongly supported by a recent 
tentative discovery of large positive cosmological constant (Perlmutter et al. 1999; Krauss and Turner 1999). 
Another important consequence of this discovery is the existence of the cosmological event horizon, as different 
from usually considered particle horizon (as discussed above).  
